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According to general agreement, the nuclear material safeguards proce-
dure is organized in such a way that the plant operator generates all data
necessary for the establishment of a material balance, that the inspectors
verify the operator's data with the help of independent measurements and
that if there are no significant differences between the operator's data and
the inspector's findings the material balance is established with the help
of the operator's data. This procedure implies two tests of significance:
one difference test (D-test) for the comparison of the operator's and the
inspector's data, and one for the material balance establishment (MUF-test).
In the theoretical part it is shown that under the assumption, that in
case of diversion the operator falsifies a~~ data by a class specific amount,
it is optimal in the sense of the probability of detection to use the differ-
ence MUF-D as the test statistics. However, as there are arguments for keep-
ing the two tests separately, and furthermore, as it is not clear that the
combined test statistics is optimal for any diversion strategy, the overall
guaranteed probability of detection for the bivariate test is determined.
A numerical example is given applying the theoretical tools presented in
the theoretical part. Using the material balance data of a Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU) fabrication plant the variances of MUF, D (no diversion) and
MUF-D are calculated with the help of the standard deviations of operator and
inspector measurements. The two inventories of the material balance are
stratified. The sampies sizes of the strata and the total inspection effort
for data verification are determined by game theoretical methods (attribute
sampling) .
On the basis of these results the overall detection probability of the
combined system (data verification and material accountancy) is determined
both for the MUF-D test and the bivariate (D, MUF) test as a function of the
goal quantity. The results of both tests are evaluated for different diver-
sion strategies.
Verifizierung von Nuklearen Materialbilanzen: Allgemeine Theorie und Anwen-
dung auf eine Fabrikationsanlage für hochangereichertes Uran
Zusammenfassung
Entsprechend einer allgemeinen Übereinkunft ist das Safeguard-Verfahren für
nukleares Material so organisiert, daß der Inspektor die Betreiberdaten an-
hand unabhängiger Messungen überprüft und dann, falls keine signifikanten Un-
terschiede zwischen Inspektor- und Betreiberdaten auftreten, die Materialbi-
lanz mit den Betreiberdaten schließt. Diese Vorgehensweise impliziert zwei
Signifikanztests: zum einen den Differenzentest (D-Test) für den Vergleich
der Inspektor- und Betreiberdaten und zum andern den Materialbilanztest (MUF-
Test).
Im theoretischen Teil der Arbeit wird gezeigt, daß, falls im Falle einer Ent-
wendung der Betreiber alle Daten um einen klassenspezifischen Betrag ver-
fälscht, der (MUF-D)-Test optimal in Bezug auf die Entdeckungswahrscheinlich-
keit ist. Es gibt jedoch Argumente dafür, die beiden Tests getrennt zu behan-
deln. Da ferner nicht klar ist, ob der kombinierte Test für beliebige Entwen-
dungsstrategien optimal ist, wird die Gesamtentdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit für
den bivariaten Test bestimmt.
An einem numerischen Beispiel wird das in der Arbeit dargestellte theoreti-
sche Handwerkzeug angewendet. Dazu werden die Daten einer Fabrikationsanlage
für hochangereichertes Uran benutzt und die Varianzen von MUF, D (im Falle
einer Nichtentwendung) und MUF-D mit Hilfe der Standardabweichungen der In-
spektor- und Betreibermessungen berechnet. Die zwei Inventare der Materialbi-
lanz werden stratifiziert. Ferner werden die Stichprobenumfänge für die ein-
zelnen Strata mit Hilfe spieltheoretischer Methoden bestimmt und der Gesamt-
inspektionsaufwand für die Datenverifizierung berechnet (attribute sampling).
Auf der Grundlage dieser Ergebnisse wird die Gesamtentdeckungswahrscheinlich-
keit des kombinierten Systems (Datenverifizierung und Materialbilanz) ermit-
telt. Dazu werden sowohl der MUF-D, als auch der bivariate (D, MUF)-Test ver-
wendet und die Güte als Funktion der Zielmenge bestimmt. Die Ergebnisse beider





2. Material Accountability 5
2.1 Material Balance Principle 5
2.2 Measurement Errors 6
2.3 Material Balance Test 9
3. Data Verification 12
3.1 Verification of Inventory Data 12
3.1.1 Game Theoretical Treatment of Model A 14
3.1.2 Game Theoretical Treatment of Model B 16
3.1.3 Comments about Attribute Sampling According to the IAEA
Technical Manual, Part F 23
3.1.4 Comments about Mass Value Sampling 27
3.2 Remark on the Verification of Flow Data 29
4. Systems Effectiveness 30
4.1 Separate Tests for the Material Balance Establishment and Data
Verification 31
4.2 Combined Material Balance Establishment and Data Verification
Test 40
4.3 Comparison of the Different Test Procedures 43
PART II 47
PLANT DATA 47
5. Description of Plant Operations 48
6. Material Accountability and Data Verification 54
PART III 62
NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS 62
7. Material Accountability 63
8. Data Verification 65
8.1 Model A
8.2 Model B
















Like in any other material processing industrial plant, material bal-
ances are established in nuclear plants, which serve the purpose of process
surveillance, evidencing the whereabouts of the material processed, and
pursue additional objectives. Besides these objectives, the material bal-
ance in nuclear plants takes still another and very significant role re-
sulting from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation. of Nuclear Weapons provides interna-
tional safeguards allowing to inspect the fissionable material used for
peaceful application by the nuclear industries of signatory states. The
responsible organization for these international safeguards is the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and for the member countries
of the European Communities the Safeguards Directorate in Luxembourg.
After lengthy preparation and negotiations the details, Le. the prin-
ciples and organization of these international safeguards, were fixed in
1971 and stipulated in an IAEA model agreement /1/. According to this model
agreement the most important tool of safeguarding is the principle of ma-
terial accountancy supplemented by containment and surveillance. Safe-
guarding has been so organized that the operators of nuclear plants record
the source data allowing to establish the material balance, transmit them
in a summarized form to the competent national and regional authority, re-
spectively, which, in this turn, submits them to the international authori-
ty, the IAEA. The IAEA verifies the data received by its own independent
measurements; in case that the IAEA measurements agree with that of the
plant operator within the accuracy of measurement, the international au-
thority will accept these data and establish the material balance, exclu-
sively relying on the data supplied by the operators.
The 1971 model agreement did not stipulate all details of safeguards.
Although the target was described verbally by "timely detection of the di-
version of significant amounts", no quantitative statements were made as to
the mea,ningof "timely" and " s ignificant". Neither was the probability de-
fined with. which a particular diversion was to be detected. For this reason,
a number of analyses for existing plants were performed after 1971 which to
give an idea of the numerical values of the variablesspecified. Such anal-
yses were also made on the German side /2/, /3/.
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In this work a similar analysis is performed for the NUKEM plant in
Wolfgang near Hanau which fabricates primarily fuel elements containing
highly enriched Uranium. The objective of this work in a more restricted
sense is to analyze the application of the safeguards system of the safe-
guards authorities to a nuclear plant processing high enriched uranium, with
- the efficiency of the material balance accountancy system,
- the optimum distribution of inspection efforts required for data verifica-
tion,
- the efficiency of data verification, and
- the efficiency of total safeguarding
being the major subjects of the study. The efficiency is considered as the
optimum and guaranteed probability of detection as a function of the inspec-
tion effort and the alleged amount of fissionable material diverted. The
objective of this work in a broader sense was to analyze requirements feasi-
ble technically for the numerical values of the significant amounts indi-
cated above. In the last years, in particular, this discussion regained a
world-wide interest; the figures assumed under the aspect of safeguarding
were not always in conformance with the technical possibilities available.
In this evident from the definition of the efficiency concept that
strategies ofdiversion have to be considered when analyzing this variable.
Therefore, such a procedure does not at all imply the imputation that an
individual operator actually intends to divert fissionable materiaL Still
more so, among the conceivable strategies of diversion the most favorable
strategy of diversion must be determined for the operator (theoretically
acting in an unlawful manner) so that the guaranteed probability of detec-
tion is really determined by optimizing the inspection effort. According to
the organization of the safeguards system two categories of diversion strat-
egies have to be considered, namely
the strategies by which material is diverted without data falsification,
taking advantage of the inaccuracy of measurements and relying on the
hope that the (inaccurate) material balance does not allow detection of
this diversion; and
the strategies by which the material balance data are falsified so that
the material balance "evens up" and the difference between the reported
and the true value can be diverted.
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Finally, to determine the efficiency of the total system, combina-
tions of both categories of strategies. have to be considered.
The statements above automatically lead to the layout of this work: In
the first part the theoretical considerations are presented which lead to the
formalism needed for the optimization of safeguards measures and, further-
more, for the determination of the efficiency of the system. As a large part
of these considerations has already been published (see, e.g., /4/, /5/),
only those results are derived in fall length, which are new, and the numer-
ical application of which is a genuine purpose of this study.
In the second part, a description of the nuclear plant under considera-
tion and an indication of the major technical parameters, the NUKEM material
accountancy system, as practical today, and the verification system, as con-
ceived, will be presented.
It should be underlined here that although the used measurement ac-
curacies have been given by the competent NUKEM members, an experimental con-
firmation of these data is missing in some cases. This means that the calcu-
lated variances and probabilities of detection, respectively, are incontest-
able theoretically, but that they still wait for experimental verification
by "integral experiments" prior to their practical use (see e.g. /6/, /7/).
In the last part the theory outlined in the first part is applied to the
NUKEM data: The accuracy of the accountancy' system, the optimal sampie sizes
of the data verification system, and the efficiencies of the total system is
determined for alternative test procedures. It should be noted that it was
this latter question which stimulated this work, as there was the problem,
whether or not a test procedure, which is the best one in a clearly defined
statistical sense, should be replaced by another one, which has practical ad-
vantages. This problem could only be discussed at the hand of a concrete ex-




In this part, the theory of a safeguards system based on the material
accountability principle and on the procedure where the inspector verifies
the data of the operator which are used for the material balance test is
developed.
Basically, it is agame theoretical approach. More precisely, the in-
herent conflict situation between the operator who - perhaps - might divert
material and the inspector who has to detect any diversion, is described by
a zero-sum-game with the probability of detection as payoff to the inspec-
tor (a first principle's justification for this approach has been given in
Ref. /5/).
In the following, the theory will be developed in all its details rele-
vant for practical applications, only some formal proofs will be deleted as




In this chapter the basic formulae for the establishment of the material
balance at the end of one inventory period are put together. This formalism
has been documented many times (see, e.g., /4/, /5/); we repeat it here as it
will be used throughout this work.
2.1 Material Balance Principle
Let us consider a weil defined material balance area of a nuclear facil-
ity that contains at a given time to some nuclear material into which enter




The material contained in the material balance area at time t
o
is called
the physica~ inventory 1
0





] gives the book inventory B at t
l
, i.e., the amount of material




The amount of material actually contained in the material balance area at
time t
l
is called the physical inventory 1
1
•
If all material contained in and passing through, the material balance
area in the interval of time [to,t
l
] is carefully accounted for, and if no
material has disappeared or has been diverted then the difference between the
book inventory B at t
l
and the physical inventory 1
1
should be zero. This is
simply a consequence of the law of conservation of matter. However, as not
all of these conditions must be satisfied, the difference between these two
quantities at the end of one inventory period, which for historical reasons
has been called material unaccounted for ,(MUF)1)
(2-2)
is not always zero. Thus arises the problem of finding out the various causes
of this difference being nonzero and, furthermore, of trying to separate them.
1)
It would be better to call this quantity 'book-physical inventory differ-
ence', as in most cases the material is accounted for, but with measure-
ment errors. Infact this term has been used for some time (see, e.g.,
Stewart /8/).
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Before going on, we will formulate the 'MUF-equation' (2.2) in a some-
what different way: Let us assume that all the data necessary for the estab-
lishment of the material balance may be classified into K classes of material
where the i-th class contains N. batches, i=l ••• K. Then, if x .. is the opera-
1 1J
tor's measurement result of the material content of the j-th batch of the
i-th class, i=l •.• K, j=l •••N., the difference MUF between the book and the
1
ending physical inventory may be written as the algebraic sum of these meas-
urement data:
with O.. =1, if
1J
O.. =-1, if x ..
1J 1J
x .. belongs to beginning inventory or receipts, and with
1J
belongs to shipments or ending inventory.
2.2 Measurement Errors
We consider first the case that the material content of the j-th item
of the i-th class is determined with the help of a unique measurement (e.g.,
and let eO" be the random
1J
error of the
active interrogation). Let T .. be the true value of this material content,
1J
error of the measurement, do. be the calibration
1
measurement common to all measurements of this class. Then the
result x .. of this measurement can be written as
1J
x .. = T .. +eO ' .+dO., i=1. •• K, j=1. .• N.1J 1J 1J 1 1
(2-4)
We assume that the errors are normally distributed random variables with zero




E (dO.) = 0
1




cov(dO.,dO ' ,) = 0 for ifi'1 1
cov (eo. ., dO ' , ) O.1J 1
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The variance of one single measurement is then given by
2
var (X .. ) = 0"0 . +0"0 . ,
~J r~ s~
i=l ••• K,· j=1. •• N. ,
~
(2-6)
and the variance of the sum of all measurements of the i-th class is given by
\ 222
var(L,X.') = N. '0"0 .+N. '0"0 .
~ ~J . ~ r~ ~ s~
i=1. •• K . (2-7)
(2-8)
We consider second the case that the material content of the j-th item of
the i-th class is determined with the help of three different steps each
causing a measurement error (e.g., sampling, volume determination, concentra-
tion determination). Then the result x .. of this measurement can be written as
~J
V V S C C
x .. = (V .. +eO' .+do .)· (C .. +eo .. +eO' .+do .)
~J ~J ~J ~ ~J ~J ~J ~
where V.. [~J, and C.. [kgU/~J are the true values of volume and concentration,
~J S ~J C
where eg .. , eO .. and eO .. are the random errors of volume determination,
~J ~J ~J V C
sampling and concentration determination, and where do. and dO. are the cali-
~ ~
bration errors of volume and concentration determination. (We assume that
there is no 'persistent' sampling error, as we assume that the solution is
homogenized in such a way that the concentration in one sampie deviates only
randomly from the average concentration in the solution).
We assume again that the errors are normally distributed random varia-
bles with zero expectation values and known variances, and that errors from
different classes are independent:
V
E (eo .. )
~J
S
E (eo .. )
~J
C
E (eo .. )
~J
V
E (do .. )
~J
C




var (eo .. ) =: O"OV .
~J r~
S 2





cov (eQ. . . , eo~ )
O~J i'j' o for (i,j)rf(i',j'), ~=V,S,C
V












o for irfi' , R,=V,S,C
R, R,
cov (eO. . ,dO. , )
1.J 1.
o for R,=V,S,C • (2-9)
The variance of the measurement of the material content of one item is
then given by the following formula, if one neglects second order terms:
2 2 2 2 222
var (X .. ) = V..• (<rOS . +O'OC . +O'OC ) +C .... (O'OV +O'OV ) ,
1.J 1.J r1. r1. si 1.J ri si
i=I ••• K, j=I ••• N, ,
1.
(2-10)




\ 2 2 2 \ 2 2L.v· ,. (O'OS .+O'oe .) + (LV .. ) ·O'OC . +
. 1.J r1. r1. . 1.J S1.
J J
\ 2 2 \ 2 2+ LC, ··O'OV . + (LC.,) ·O'OV






If we assurne that the true values of volume and concentration of the dif-
ferent items of this class are the same,
V..=V., C, .=C" i=I •.•K,
1.J 1. 1.J 1.
then formula (2-11) simplifies to
[
2 2 2 2 2 ]N,· V.· (<10S ,+O'oe .) +C. ·O'OV. +
1. 1. r1. r1. 1. r1.
2 ~2 2 2 2 ]+ N.· V.· 0'oe . +C .• <rOV. •
1. 1. S1. 1. S1.










then we can write formula (2-11') in the following form
var(Lx,.) = X~· rN .• (o~s .+o6c .+o~v .)+N~. (o~C .+o~v .)] ,
, 1.J l 1. r1. r1. r1. 1. S1. S1.
J
(2-11")




According to formula (2-3) the variance of the Material Unaccounted For
is then given by
var(MUF) = Lvar(Ix .. ) ,
. : ~J
~ J
where var(~X.. ) is either given by formula (2-7) or by formula (2-11) resp.
j ~J
its simplified versions (2-11') and (2-11"). It should be noted that there
may be random losses which may contribute to the variance of the Material Un-
accounted For. If this is true, then formula (2-13) has to be generalized ap-
propriately.
2.3 Material Balance Test
In the following, we aggregate all our measurements to initial physical
inventory I O' receipts R, shipments Sand ending physical inventory I 1 • We
write
I O E(Io)+eo










where E(Io )' E(R), E(S) and E(I1
) are the true values of I
O
' R, Sand I
1
,
where the expectation values of the errors are zero:
(2-14b)















The measurement errors may cause a nonzero book-physical inventory dif-
ference, as already explained. In order to understand this, we write ego
(2-1) with the help of (2-14a) in the following form:
(2-15)
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If no material is missing, we have because of the conservation of matter
(2-16)
and therefore
This however, leads immediately to
E(MUF) = 0 •
W~ call this relation the null hypothesis HO'
(2-17)
(2-18)
We now can formulate our problem which is to find out whether the non-
vanishing book-physical-inventory difference is caused only by measurement
errors. In statistical terms: we have to test the null hypothesis HO' We
achieve this by choosing a significance threshold s for the sampie value
A
(realized value) of the book-physical-inventory difference MUF and by de-
ciding
A
HO correct if MUF~s (2-19)
The value of the significance threshold s is fixed with the help of the
probability of error of the first kind a, which is defined by
(2-20)
In words, a is the probability that 'HO not correct' will be stated if, in
fact, Ho is true. The problem of the appropriate choice of the value of a
will be discussed in Chapter 4.
If the result of the measurement is
A
MUF>s
we conclude that 'the null hypothesis Ho is not correct' or 'the alternative
hypothesis H
1
is correct'. The nature of the problem determines whether we
want to formulate the alternative hypothesis H
1
explicitely. Let us assume
that it is reasonable to formulate H
1
in the following way:
H
1
: E(MUF) = M , (2-21)
where M is a quantity greater than zero. The choice of the appropriate value
of M will also be discussed in Chapter 4. In this case, we can characterize




In words, ß is the probability that 'H
1
not correct l will be stated if, in
fact, H
1
is true (or, in line with standard statistical terminology, it is
the probability that the statement 'H not correct' will not be made) •o
The probabilities of errors first and second kind for normally and in-
dependently distributed measurement errors and random losses are given by













is the normal or Gaussian distribution function, U its inverse, and, with the
definitions (2-14c),
(2-26)
Since the purpose of the test procedure described so far is to detect
unusual losses or diversion, for obvious reasons we call the probability of
error of the first kind, ct, the false alarm probability, and we call one
minus the probability of the error of the second kind, 1-ß, the probability
of detection. Because of the central importance of ego (2-24), which estab-
lishes a relation between false alarm probability ct, variance of measurements
2o , amount M assumed to be diverted, and probability of detection we discuss
it here in some detail. We see immediately:
The probability of detection increases with increasing amount M assumed to
be missing (or diverted). This property is a natural requirement in any de-
tection system.
- The probability of detection increases with decreasing standard deviation
o. This is reasonable, too. If one remembers that the standard deviation
ordinarily decreases with increasing effort (money or man-hours), this
property means that the probability of detection increases with increasing
effort.
The probability of detection increases with increasing false alarm proba-
bility. This is a well-known property of any detection system (e.g., fire
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alarm system): the more sensitive the system is, the higher is its false
alarm rate.
3. Data Verification
It has been outlined in the introduction that the material data, which
are reported by the plant operator, are verified by the safeguards authority
with the help of independent measurements.
In this chapter we will develop the theory for data verification proce-
dures the main purpose is the determination of optimum sampIe sizes for dif-
ferent classes of material and furthermore, the determination of the effi-
ciency of such procedures for a given total verification effort.
As the problem in its most general form is by far too complicated for
any analytical treatment, we will consider special cases with respect to the
diversion strategy chosen by the plant operator (models A and B) and with
respect to the sampling procedure chosen by the inspector (attribute and
variable sampling).
3.1 Verification of Inventory Data
Inventory data verification is by its very nature a time independent
problem: We assume that the plant operations have been stopped, that the
operator has reported all inventory data. Furthermore, let us assume that the
inspector verifies n. of the N. batch data in the i-th class with the help of
~ ~
independent measurements on a random sampling basis, and let the measurement
result be y .. , i=l •.• K, j=l ••• n .• (For simplicity we have assumed that the
~J ~
data are rearranged in such a way, the the first n. of the N. batch data of
~ ~
the i-th class are verified.
Already in the foregoing chapter we have pointed out that frequently
one material content determination consists of several independent
measurements, e.g., volume-, concentration- and isotopic composition,
and that consequently independent sampling plans could in principle
be established for these measurements. For simplicity we assume here
that always - if at all - the whole material content measurement of
one batch is verified. The following considerations are based on the
case that the verification of the material data of one item is per-
formed with the help of a unique measurement; the more complicated
- 13 -
case can be treated as well, but leads to more complicated formulae.
As the inspector must not use the same instruments as the operator, we
have under the assumption, that no data are falsified by the operator (null
hypothesis Ho)
y .. = T .. +er .. +dr . , i=1. •• K, j=1. .• n. ,1J 1J 1J 1 1
(3-1 )
where the random errors er .. and the calibration errors d r .. , common to all1J 1J
measurements of the i-th class, are again assumed to be random variables
with zero expectation values and known variances:
E (er .. )
1J
E(dr.) = 0 ;
1











cov (er .. , d r . ,) = 01J· 1 ( 3-2)
We now define two different falsification scenarios, which however do
not comprise all possible falsification strategies.
We call model A the case that all data of the i-th class are falsified




y .. = T .. +ll.+er .. +dr. , i=1. •• K, j=1. .• n .•
1J 1J 1 1J 1 1
(3-3 )
We call model B the case that only r. (~N.) data of the i-th class are
1 1
falsified by the same class specific amount (alternative hypothesis H
1
); we
therefore have for those data which are falsified, and which are selected
by the inspector,
y';J' = T. ·+ll.+er .. +dr. , i=1. •. K, j=1. •• ,Q"... 1J 1 1J 1
( 3-4)
where ,Q, is a hypergeometrically distributed random variable, whereas we have
for those data, which are not falsified and which are selected by the in-
spector,
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Y1.'J' = T, .+eI .. +dI, , i=l ••• K, j=l ••• n.-fl- .1.J 1.J 1. 1.
(3-5)
It has been outlined already in the introduction that data falsification
represents a second class of diversion strategies: The data are falsified in
such a way that the book-physical-inventory difference MUF is not significant
thus, the amount Mi of material which is equivalent to the difference between
the sum of the true and the reported data can be diverted, if the data veri-
.fication procedure did not lead to significant differences between the re-
ported data and the inspector's findings.
In the last years several formalisms have been developed for the deter-
mination of optimum sampie sizes. In the following we first will present in
some detail the game theoretical formalism for model A and for a special case
of model B because according to our conviction this formalism is the appro-
priate one, as it explicitely takes into account the interent conflict situa-
tion. Thereafter, we discuss further approaches and compare these approaches
with the help of some numerical calculations.
3.1.1 Game Theoretical Treatment of Model A
As the inspector is not interested in estimating the true values T .. ,
1.J
but only in knowing whether or not data have been falsified, he will form a
test on the basis of the differences y .. -x ..• For model A we can determine
1.J 1.J
the optimum test statistics in the sense of the Neyman-Pearson-Lemma (i.e.,
that test statistics, which leads among all tests with false alarm probabil-
ity a to the highest probability of detection) for a given total falsifica-
tion. We will present here only the result of the analysis, the formal proof
can be found in the literature /9/:
Let us consider the differences
z .. := x .. -y .. , i=l ••• K, j=l ••• n.
1.J 1.J 1.J 1.
(3-6)
where x, . and y., are material data of the j-th item of the i-th class, re-
1.J 1.J
ported by the operator and found by the inspector. Let the null hypothesis
HO be given by
E(z,.) = 0 for i=1. •• K, j=1. •• n. ,
1.J 1.
and the alternative hypthesis H
1
(3-7)
E (Z .. )
~J
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ll.: Ill.·N. = M>O for i=1. •• K, j=1. •• n .•
~ . ~ ~ ~
~
(3-8)
Then the critical region of the Neyman-Pearson test for HO and any H
1
with
fixed value of M is given by the set
K n.
N. ~
{D I ~ . L z .. ::= n. ~Ji=l ~ j=l
D>S} (3-9)
The test characteristic or probability of detection 1-ß defined by
(3-10)
as a function of the error first kind or false alarm probability a defined
by














:= 00 .+0'1 .
r~ r~
2 2
GO .+Gr . ,
s~ s~
i=l ••. N .
The optimal diversion strategy
is given by the following expression
M (3-13 )
*lli = i=l •.• K , (3-14)
where
We now assurne that the verification of the data of one item of the i-th
class requires the effort 8. 1 i=l .•• K (man hours or money), and that the in-
~
spector has the total effort C for the inventory at his disposal. The prob-
lem of determining the optimal inspection sampie sizes therefore consists in
- 16 -
optimizing the probability of detection (3-12) with respect to the sampie













i=l. .. K , (3-16)
and the guaranteed probability of detection
* (M.1e )1-ß = ~ a(C) -U1- a . (3-17)
As we would expect, this guaranteed probability of detection is a monotonuous-
ly increasing function of the total amount M assumed to be diverted, and the
total verification effort C.
3.1.2 Game Theoretical Treatment of Model B
Contrary to the situation in the case of model A it is not possible, to
determine the optimum test statistic in the sense of the Neyman-Pearson-Lemma
for model B. It is, however, reasonable, to use also in this case the D-
statistics as test statistics. But still it is ~ot possible to determine ana-
lytically optimum sampie sizes without making assumptions about the parameter
values. An approximate solution to this problem, where the measurement errors
are taken into account, is presented in Ref. /9/; here we will consider a
different case which thereafter will be compared with other approaches.
Attribute sampling (as opposed to variable sampling) is a procedure the
purpose of which is to test whether or not the data of one item are falsified
by an amount which is large compared to the measurement uncertainties. In the
following we will consider this case which means that we completely ignore
the measurement errors.
Let us first present the relation between total number N of items, in-
spection sampie size n, number of falsified batch data rand probability of
detection 1-ß for one class of material, as it serves as a basis for all
forthcoming considerations:
- 17 -
In case of drawing without repZacement the probability of no detection
is given by the following expression
, ß = (3-18)
which is a special case of the weil known hypergeometric formula. Because of
the identity




















which ist the exact formula for the drawing with repZacement case. For small
number of falsifications we can write this as
r
n





If the product r'n is much smaller than N, then both formulae (3-20) and
(3-21) coincide to
Game TheoreticaZ FormaZism /9/
Let us assume that we have K classes of material, and that every class
consists of k. subclasses with Nk batches, l~i~K, l~j~k .. Every batch con-~ i ~
tains the amount ~ .. of material; the inspection effort for the verification
~J
of one element of the i-th class is E., l~i~K.
~
The problem is to optimize the sampie sizes n .. in the various sub-
~J
classes under the boundary condition of a fixed total verification effort C,
K








assuming that the operator wants to divert the total am0unt M of material by
falsifying r .. data of the j-th subclass of the i-th class by the amount ~ .. ,
lJ lJ
K k.l
M :::; l: r ~ .. ·r ..
i=l . 1 lJ lJJ=
(3-24)
It should be noted that in the sense of the attribute
sampling we have assumed that the operator falsifies
- if at all - the data of r .. batches by their full
lJ
amount.
Let us start our approach with the formulae for the probability of de-
tection l-ß, which are generalizations of formula (3-19) to K classes,















in case of drawing without replacement
K k. (:ij)C~: -rij) K
k. n.-I ( )l l lJ r ..
1-ß 1- rr rr 1- rr rr rr 1- lJ (3-26)eij) . N.. -m .i=l j=l i=l J=l m=O lJn ..
lJ
Again, for n .. «N.. formula (3-26) is passing into formula (3-25).
lJ lJ
It can be derived from very general game theoretic considerations that
the optimum sampie sizes of the inspector are solutions of a two-person
zero-sum game with -ß as the payoff to the inspector and the following sets
of strategies:
K k.l
I E. I n .. = C ,
i=l l j=l lJ
K k.
lr I ~ .. ·r ..
i=l j=l lJ lJ
M,
n .. ~O, r .. ~O, j=1. •• k., i=1. •• K} •
lJ lJ l
If the sampie sizes n .. and r .. are treated as continous variables, then the
lJ lJ






C . exp (-K • E: . )
J.
K k~
I E:~·exp(-K·E:~) I ~~hN~h
~=1 h=l
N. ,. (l-exp (-K • E: . ) )
J.J J.




* *1-ß(~ , ~ ) = 1-exp(-K·C) ; (3-29)
here, the parameter K is uniquely determined by the following relation
K k. K k.J. J.
l. l: N. ,. ~ ... exp (-K • E: . ) = l. I ~ .. ·N., - M
i=l ' '1 J.J J.J J. i=l . 1 J.J J.JJ= J=
TWo-step~procedure
(3-30)
Prom the practical point of view it is desirable to develop formulae
which can be used as easy as possible by the inspectors at the plant site.
The formalism developed so far lends itself to such a procedure as will be
shown now.
From (3-27) we get the following distribution of the total given effort







C . exp (-K • E: . )
J.
K k~
l: E:~·exp(-K·E:). l. ~~hN~h
~=1 h=l
k.J.
• L ~ .. ·N. ,
. '1 J.J J.JJ=
(3-31)
C • exp (-K . E: . )
J.
k.J.
·iI.· I N ..
J. . '1 J.JJ=





l. 11, ,'N, .








represents the expectation value of a random variable, The parameter K in






, 1 ~ ~'1 ~J
~= J=






















The advantage of these formulae is that they can be calculated before the
actual inventory verification procedure at the safeguards authority's head-
quarters, if there exists some idea about the values of 11., 1~i~K, e,g, from
~
earlier investigations, At the plant site the inspector then can determine
the sampie sizes n~. for the subclasses, after having obtained the values of
~J









~ ~ h=1 ~
'11. , 'N, ,
~J ~J
(3-35)
*where ~. and C. are given by (3-32) and (3-34),
~ ~
-Let us still consider the following problem, The values of .the lli' 1~i~K came
from data of foregoing inspections thus, it is possible but there are some
differences between these and actual data which are not to be neglected. In
such a case the following procedure is possible: during inspection the in-
spector calculates the actual g" 1~i~K, with the help of formula (3-32) and
~
the actual data and we assume
1~i~K , (3-36)
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With this A we can generalize our above formula:



























where 1-ß is the given probability of detection. So we have the inspection







The formulae (3-37) - (3-40) can be computed before inspection for various A.
At the beginning of the inspection the inspector has to determine the A and








If we now assume that then we know that K(A) is solution
K k.
1
exp (-K (A) •d· I ~. rN.. + A· exp (-K (A) •d . N
i=l l j =l 1J
K k,
1
I )1, I N..
Q,=1 1 j =1 1J
K


















So we have the result that K(A) is monotonically decreasing in A and C(A)
monotonically increasing in A.
Measurement Errors
Although in this section attribute sampling-is considered, it is inter-
esting to determine the influence of random errors on the probability of de-
tection. (It should be kept in mind, however, that in the case that measure-
ment errors cannot be ignored, the sampie sizes (3-27) and (3-28) are not
optimal.
Let us assume that the classes are homogeneous (or equivalently, let us
restriet on the consideration of class sampie sizes). If the D-statistics
(3-9) is used as test statistics, then the probability of detecting an falsi-
fication of total size M is approximately given by (see /5/)
1-ß (3-43)
2 2





= ~ 2.(a;i 2)!.. N. -- +a .
. 1 ~ * s~
~= n.
~







where 2 and 2 given byari asi
are
2 2 2 2
a
2
.+a 2ari aori+aIri , asi ,os~ Isi
and where * and * given by (3-27) and (3-28) withn. r. are
~ ~
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3.1.3 Comments about Attribute Sampling According to the IAEA Technical
Manual, Part F /10/
Short description
Let M be the goal quantity and 1-8 the total probability of detection
to be guaranteed by the sampling scheme. If there are K classes of material,
and if every batch of the i-th class, i=l ••• K, contains the amount ~. of ma-
J.







i=l •.• K , (3-45)
if he wants to divert the total amount M of material, which corresponds to
the goal quantity, from the i-th class. According to formula (3-21) in the
case
r, « N. ,
J. J.
i=1 ••. K ,
the class probability of not detection 8
i






i=1. •• K • (3-46)
If however the operator wants to divert the amount M of material by








where M. is the amount of material to be diverted from the i-th class,
J.
'V





i=l .•• K • (3-48)
'V
In this case the probability of no detection 6
i





From (3-45) and (3-48) we get
i=l ••• K . (3-49)
'"
M. M.J.. J..
r. - = ·r. i=l ••• K ,J.. lli M J..









If the inspector now determines his sampIe sizes n., i=l ••• K, according to
J..
(3-46) such that the class probabilities of no detection are all equal to S,
then we get for the overall probability of no detection in case that the











In other words: If the inspector determines his sampIe sizes n., i=l ••• K,J..
such that the class probability S of no detection is guaranteed under the
assumption that the total amount M is diverted from one class, then the to-
tal probability of no detection is again S under the assumption, that the
diversion is distributed over the K classes.
Corrurzents
a) As already mentioned, this procedure is only approximately valid for
r.«N., i=l ••• K.
J.. J..








b) In order to be able to use this procedure it is necessary that the to-
tal amount M of material can be diverted from one class.
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c) Different inspection efforts 8., i=l •.• K, are not taken into account in
~
this formalism, this is achieved only in the game theoretic formalism.
For comparison purposes, we derive from the game theoretic formula (3-27)










M ) KK I tl,·N.
'-1 J JL tl.·N, J-




In Table 3.1 two numerical examples are given for illustrative purposes.
Under the condition 8.=8 for i=1,2, .•• ,K it is possible to show under certain
~









= N. (l-ß. )
~ ~
i=1,2, ••• ,K (3-46a)



















Now we expand ß ~ in MacLaurins' series, retaining only the first order term
with tl,/M as variable. Thus
~
tl./M
1 + tn ß ~
and





Manual F Game theory Manual F Game theory
Example 1
N = 801
N = 10 <5.27> = 6 <7.97> = 82 <4.65> = 5 <4.25> = 5
l-l1 = 100 g






<5.61> = 6 <13.52> = 14 <16.82> = 172 <5.89> = 6
l-l = 5 g1
l-l2 = 1000 g
tv
(j\
Table 3-1: Comparison of 'optimum' sample sizes according to Manual F and according to the game theoretic
formalism for 2 classes of material with the same inspection effort for one batch of each class,
M = 5000 g, ß = 0.05
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1I./M




*and we have that the n. of formula (3-46a) is equal to the n. of formula
~ ~
(3-27a) •
3.1.4 Comments about Mass Value Sampling (/11/)
Short description
Let us assume that there is a set of N batches which together contain
the amount x of material; the single batches may contain different parts of
material. Then the mass-value sampling recommends the following procedure:
Choose a mass unit z, e.g., the minimum discrepancy which can be detected
by the inspector's quantitative technique; the population size in mass
units then is P=x/z.
Calculate the sample size v(z), which is required for the detection of a
diversion of the amount M of material, by postulating the probability
l-S for the detection of at least one falsification in mass units; with
r=M/z one gets from (3-21)
1 1
v(z) = p. (l-S
r







Draw the sample sizes as follows: Make a random order of the batches and
from a cumulative sum of the mass units for the total amount x of mate-
rial, select v(z) different random numbers up to P or select the units
for examination at intervals of p/v(z) starting from a random point which
is less than p/v(z).
Comments
From an exact analytical point of view there are some questions and
points in mass value sampling which cannot be resolved satisfactorily:
a) How shall the mass value z be determined?
b) What is the probability to detect at least one falsified bateh?
c) Different inspection efforts E., i=l ••• K, for different classes of ma-
~
terial are not taken into account in this formalism.
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Whereas not very mueh ean be said to points a) and e), we ean give an
upper limit for the probability of no deteetion, depending on the values of
x and ß:
From (3-51) we eonelude, that for z>O v(z) is a monotone deereasing




'R-n ß =: v •
M
(3-52)
The probability to deteet one falsified bateh datum by drawing one









If we draw with replaeement v(z) mass units, then we get with (3-51) for the
probability w of deteeting no falsified bateh datum the following upper
limit:
M v(z)
w~ (1- x) = (1- =: 8(z) (3-55)
therefore, solving this equation for ß, we get with
z
x ):R-n8(z)R-n (1- ;) (3-56)
the following results: As 8(z) is a strietly inereasing function in z, the
inspector should ehoose his mass unit z as small as possible. With the help
of (3-56), he ean determine the value of ß for a given upper limit 8(z) of
deteeting no falsifieation and thereafter, he can determine his sample size
v(z) with the help of (3-51).















o < 0 (z) for all z>O • (3-59)
If we calculate the limiting mass unit sampie size v according to (3-52),







the following result: In the limiting case z+O the inspector can with the
help of (3-58) determine the value cf ß for a given limit Ö of the probabil-
ity of detecting no falsification. Thereafter, he can determine his mass
value sampie size v with the help of (3-52).
It should be noted that in both cases, z>O and z+O, the sampie sizes
v(z) and v are determined by postulating an upper limit, o(z) and 0, for the
probability of detecting no batch datum falsification, and not by postulating
a value for the - only technically interesting - probability ß of detecting
no mass unit datum falsification.
3.2 Remark on the Verification of Flow Data
In analyzing the problem of verifying inventory data one assurnes that all
data of the operator are available at the same time and furthermore, that the
batches are also available at the same time such that the inspector can select
according to a sampling plan some of the batches in order to verify their data
with the help of independent measurements.
Flow data, i.e., data of input or output batches, are generated in a
sequential manner and the batches will not be available at the same time as
they have either disappeared in the production process or have been shipped
before later batches are ready for shipment. Thus, the inspector has to de-
cide from batch to batch whether or not he will verify its data.
In analyzing this problem one has to make a distinction (which is ir-
relevant in the inventory verification case): One either has to assurne that
the operator is decided apriori to falsify a certain part of the data, or
one has to assume that he will decide from batch to batch whether or not he
- 30 -
will falsify its data. In the first case the situation is not so different
from that of the inventory verification, in fact one arrives at similar re-
sults. In the second case the situation becomes difficult; so far no satis-
fying theory has been developed for several classes of material.
In the practical application presented in the second and third part of
this paper these questions play no role because of the plant and operational
conditions. Therefore, we will not present the theory here but refer the in-
terested reader to the literature /5/.
4. Systems Effectiveness
It has been mentioned already in the introduction that according to the
safeguards procedure the operator of a nuclear plant may consider two prin-
cipally different sets of diversion strategies, namely
- the strategies by which material is diverted without data falsification,
relying on the hope that the inaccurate material balance does not allow
detection of this diversion and
- the strat€gies by which the material balance data are falsified so that the
material balance 'evens up' and the difference between the reported and the
true value can be diverted.
Generally speaking, the two safeguards measures, which counter the two
strategies just mentioned, culminate in the execution of two tests, namely
the D-test and the MUF-test, with null and alternative hypotheses
HO: E(D) = E(MUF) = 0
H1: E(D) = Mi ' E(MUF) = M2 '
(4-1)
and with the boundary condition of a fixed overall false alarm probability.
So far, we have suboptimized the two test procedures. Now, the question
arises whether or not there exists an 'optimal' combined test procedure, and
furthermore, what the efficiency of that procedure iso In the following, we
will analyze two different procedures of the inspector, thereafter, we will
discuss their qualitative aspects.
A technical problem is given by the fact that the two test statistics
MUF and D are not independent because the generator's data are used in both
these statistics.
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4.1 Separate Tests for the Material Balance Establishment and Oata Verifica-
tion
The considerations of this section are valid both for modeZs A and B if
we assume that the O-statistics is normally distributed (this is exactly true
for modeZ A and approximately true for modeZ B). We only have to take into
account that the variances of the O-statistics under the null and under the
alternative hypotheses are the same for modeZ A, and different for modeZ B
(see (3-44}). For the sake of generality, we always will write crOI
HO
and
crolHl and keep in mind that for modeZ A these two variances are equal.
Bivariate Test
(4-2)
thereafter the material balance
thresholds for these two tests.
ties (1,1 and (1,2 are given by
1-(1, := prob{-o~slIHo}1
Let us assume that first the data verification test is performed and
test. Let si and s2 be the significance
Then the single error first kind probabili-
and the total error first kind probability (total false alarm probability)
(1, is given by
(4-3)







where the correlation P
HO







and where U is the inverse of the Gaussian distribution function. In Fig-
ure 4-1 this relation between (1,1 and (1,2 is represented graphically for fixed
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for a=O.05 and p as parameter.
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The total error second kind probability (one minus the total probabili-
ty of detection) is given by
(4-6)
which leads to the following expression






J J dt2ex{ 2 2)ß 1 dt l tl-2PHltlt2+t2. 2 '27f~1-P~11 2 (i-P H )-00 -00 1
(4-7)








The optimal significance thresholds si and s2' or in other words, the




for a given total false
alarm probability are defined as those single false alarm probabilities which
minimize the probability of no detection under the assumption that the goal
quantity M of material is distributed in an optimal way from the point of



















where ß(Ml ,M2 ; a l




the boundary condition (4-4), and where finally Mi and M
2






Solution of the Optimization Problem
(4-10)dt f(t,x)F (x)
Let us carry through first the maximization of ß with respect to Mi and
M2 • If we eliminate M2
by M-M
1









f(g(x),x)' dx g(x) +
g(x)
f dt ~X f (t,x)
-00
(4-11)
i 0, 1, (4-12)
the following expression for the derivation of ß with respect to M
1
:
*and the optimal value M1 of M1 for arbitrary a 1 and a 2 is given by
(4-13)
o (4-14)





We assume that a
2





in fact we get by implicite differentiation
(
u2 ~ {U -p 'U ~ dUa 2 1-a1 0 1-a2 a 2o = exp - --, ------- ,-- +
2 ~r2 dUa
"l-Po 1
By using the relation
~ 2~{ .
U U -P 'U
a 1 1-a2 0 1-a1)









we obtain from (4-15)
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(4-17)




~ -exp~ :J)../U_1_-_a..;...2_-_0:_~.:..F_-_p_l_· _[0_00_1 _._U_l_-_a_l_-_:_~ •
\ ~ 1_p~i
(4-18)
Using the determinant (4-14) for the optimal value M7 of Ml' we get the fol-








As the first three factors of this relation are always greater zero, we ob-




2 ( ) 2 < )U U -p·U U U -p·U( a 1) 1-a1 0 1-a2 ( a 2) 1-a2 0 1-a1 .exp\:-- .<j> - p ·exp -- • . = 0
2 .r--2 0 2 .['""?
~l-p; ~l-po
(4-20)





are independent upon the goal quantity M.
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In Figure 4~2 relation (4-20) has been represented graphically, and in
Figure 4-3 both the relations (4-4) and (4-20) together with their intersec-
tions (dashed line) have been represented; the set of these intersections is
* *the set of optimal solutions (al' a
2
).
Propepties of the SoZution
In order to see whether or not the solutions found above are really so-
lutions of the optimization problem (4-9), we have to determine the second




• As these derivates are somewhat
lengthy, and as no clear analytical conclusions can be drawn, we only report
that so far all numerical calculations have shown, that the solutions (4-18)
and (4-20) infact are solutions to the optimization problem (4-9).
There is a geometrical interpretation of eg. (4-20), which also allows
a graphical determination of the optimal significance thresholds:





cording to (4-19) given by
o (4-21 )
This represents a differential eguation the general solution of which is
with crMUFlcro=p o :
const • (4-22)
This represents a set of straight lines with slope _1_ in the (U ,U )-plane
Po al a2
(see Figure 4-4). In order that there exists a unigue solution (a;,a1), the




1has the slope - -- ,
Po
(4-4) for fixed values of a and PO. As the straight

























Figure 4-2: Graphical representation of the relation
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Figure 4-3: Graphical representation of the intersection (dashed line) of
the two relations given in Figures 4-1 and 4-2.
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Even though we cannot give an analytical expression for the guaranteed
probability of detection 1-ß(M~,M;,a~,a;), it can easily be shown that it
is a monotonously increasing function of M=M~+M;:











which is always smaller zero, therefore we get with (4-4) the result
d (l-ß(M))>O,
dM
1-ß(M=0) = a (4-23)
4.2 Combined Material Balance Establishment and Data Verification Test
Let us come back to the question for the 'optimum' test for the two
hypotheses given by (4-1). The best test with respect the probability of de-
tection, for a given value of the false alarm probability is given by the
Neyman-Pearson Lemma and can be derived as follows /12/:
Neyman-Pearson-Test
The critical region of the Neyman-Pearson test is given by the following
set of realizations ~':=(t1,t2) of (D,MUF) values
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(4-24 )
here, the constant k is determined by the error of the first kind probabili-
ty, f o is the (exact) joint density of MUF and Dunder HO'
1 1 (1 \,-1 )-'--'exp - _·t'· L. ·t
2~ IIol 2 - ~O - (4-25a)
f
1







) = _l_._l_· exp (_ .!.(t-M) I • \,-1. (t-M)) ,
2~ [L
1
! 2 ~1 --
(4-25b)





The inverses of the matrices are given by
i=O,l • (4-27)
The critical region of the test therefore is given by the following set of
realizations t of (D,MUF) values:
{( t t) .!.·t,·\,-l· t _ .!.·t , .\,-l· t +t ,·\,-l· M ~l' 2 : 2 Lo - 2 L.l - - L, 1 -
=
k' } (4-28)
which means that the optimum test statistics is given by the following ex-
pression:
1 I-i 1 I-i I-i_. t' • •t- -. t' • . t+t' •
2 - 0 2 - 1 - - '1
• M (4-29)
= =







). As it would not be reasonable, to make assumptions on all'
these parameters, one should proceed as follows: One determines the distribu-
tion of this statistics and thereafter the probability of detection for a
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given false alarm probability as a function of these parameters. Thereafter
one minimizes the probability of detection with respect to all diversion
strategies resulting in a total diversion:
M > o}
This way one gets the guaranteed probability of detection and, more important,
the appropriate test statistics.
As this program is too complicated for any analytical treatment, we now
restrict our analysis to modeZ A, i.e. the case that all item data are falsi-
fied by a class specific amount ~., i=l ••• K. If we assume that for a given
1
total falsification Mi the values of ~i' i=l ••• K, are already optimally cho-
sen, the following set of distribution strategies remain to be considered:





the test statistics is
= =
\,-1!:"L .~,









therefore the probability of detection is given by
- 43 -
1-6 (4-35)
As 1-ß is a monotone function of
\,-1
~'. L; .~ 1
* *the optimum distribution strategy (M1,M2) for a goal quantity M is given by
o . (4-36)
In this case the test statistics is given by
\,-1!:'.L; .~ M • (MUF-D) , (4-37)
(4-38)= cf> ( M
J 2 2 i
., 0'D-0'MUF
1-ßopt
which is up to a constant factor the weil known MUF-D statistics. The guaran-
teed probability of detection is
From the fact that the optimal diversion strategy is to exclusively falsify
data one might draw the wrong conclusion that the MUF-test would not be nec-
essary. Infact, if there would be no MUF test, then the operator would divert
the whole amount M by diversion into MUF, and the probability of detection
based on the D-test alone would be equal to the false alarm probability.
4.3 Comparison of the Different Test Procedures
In the following we compare the different test procedures quantitativeZy
with the help of their detection probabilities, thereafter we present some
quaZitative arguments.
Let us compare firstly the Neyman-Pearson-test (NP-test) with the
bivariate (D,MUF)-test. By definition the bivariate test cannot lead to a
higher probability of detection then the NP-test. Moreover, it can be shown
that there are diversion strategies where the NP-test really leads to a
higher detection probability than the bivariate test.
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Secondly, let us look at the (MUF-D)-test and the bivariate (D,MUF)-test.
In the case M
1
=M we know that the (MUF-D)-test is an NP-test. It is an inter-
esting question whether or not the bivariate test leads for other distribution
strategies to a higher detection probability. To answer this question we have
to consider two cases·.
In the first case
var(D»2 • var(MUF)
it can be shown theoretically that there exist strategies and combinations of




where the (D,MUF)-test is better than the
(MUF-D)-test. A numerical example is given in Figure 4-5.
In the second case
var(D)<2 • var(MUF)
we only have examples where the (MUF-D)-test is always better than the
bivariate test (see, e.g. Figure 4-6). Furthermore, we can show theoretical-





test is always better than the bivariate test. It is an open question, if
also in this case it is possible, to come with a suitable combination of a
1
and a 2 for some inspection strategies to a higher detection probability with
the bivariate test than with the (MUF-D)-test.
There are, however, criteria other than the overall probability of detec-
tion, and arguments, which have to be taken into account. One important qual-
itative argument in favor of the (MUF-D) statistic is that it does not depend
on the operator's systematic error or, in other words it is essentially a MUF
statistic adjusted for operator's bias, as estimated by the inspector. This
is an important point because (a) such information may be difficult to obtain;
(b) even if given by the operator, he may purposely ~ive a high value for his
systematic error, a value that would be difficult to verify of refute. On the
other hand, there are arguments in favor of the procedure where separate tests
for MUF and D are performed. For illustrative purposes only one major argument
shall be given here: The operator who collects all the data necessary for the
establishment of the material balance sometimes will perform the MUF-test for
plant internal purposes. Now, if the safeguards authority establishes the ma-
terial balance for the same period by using her own data in addition to those
of the operator, there exist two statements, which in an extreme case might be
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Figure 4-5: Probabilities of detection i-ß for Mode~ A and different test
procedures as functions of Mi resp. M
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Figure 4-6: Detection probability i-ß for ModeZ A and different test
















The theory which has been outlined in the first part shall now be ap-
plied to a concrete case of a nuclear material fabrication plant. It is the
purpose of this part, to collect all plant data which are necessary for the
optimization of safeguards measures and for the evaluation of the safeguards
system. In the following, we first describe the plant operations in general
terms, thereafter, we present the relevant data for one representative in-
ventory period.
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5 .. f 1 . 1)• Descr1pt10n 0 P ant Operat10ns
It is difficult to characterize the NUKEM fabrication plant in Hanau,
Federal Republic of Germany, from the safeguards point of view just by one
sentence saying that the plant was laid out to produce fuel elements for
material testing reactors and for pebble bed high temperature reactors.
Although this is the main production activity in terms of flow of high-
ly enriched uranium the safeguards dimensions of NUKEM cannot be understood,
if some important other features are not mentioned.
These are briefly as foliows:
- The plant works with high and low enriched uranium where the boundary is
20 % enrichment.
The starting product for the main fabrication is highly enriched uranium
hexafluoride.
- There is a large scrap recovery unit in which scrap recovery campaigns are
also run for clients.
Chemical, metallurgical and mechanical treatment of various types, of
uranium are possible and to a large extent the technical means and skills
are available.
- Large stocks of uranium of all enrichments are at hand in a variety of
forms and dimensions. Part of it is stored for clients.
- The stock of uranium is split into several thousands of accountancy units
spread over a large number of locations.
Part of the uranium stock is mixed with Thorium, the latter being the
major component.
- The production units are not linked so that the production activity in the
plant considered as a whole never comes to a complete standstill.
In the following only the highly enriched part is considered.
1) This chapter follows closely an earlier publication ((13/).
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For highly enriched urartium the production area can be subdivided into
for main fuel preparation and proces·sing steps as follows:
the chemical processing areas
- the MTR lines (alloy and cermet lines)
- the HTR line (kernel, particle and pebble lines)
- the uranium oxide line (pellet and rod line)
this line will be operated completely i.e. with pellet pressing,
rod loading and fuel element assembling in the future.
A schematical representation of the material flow in the NUKEM plant is
given in Figure 5-1.
As in many companies the general policy is to allow for astriet separa-
tion of responsibility between production activities and control and safety
functions. This means in practice that both the control/safety departments on
the one side and the production departments on the other side are directly
subordinated to the management.
At the various levels in the organisation the responsibility of the indi-
viduals are stated in a letter of appointment, which must be signed for agree-
ment by both the management and the appointed person.
The main safeguards-relevant responsibilities from the plant side are:
The supervisor for NM in storage and for accountancy: He is in charge of the
continuous recording and monthly reporting of all incomtng and outgoing NM. He
has to ensure that all batches in the store are correctly labelled with exter-
nal or internal shipper's data. He has to record the movement of NM-batches
from production account to production account each time the NM-batches are not
going back immediately to the storage. Finally he has to check the information
provided on the tag for the material batches which are brought back to the
store.
Responsibility forNM in the ~rocess: The individual who has to handle NM is
responsible for this material after registration of the movement in the gener-
al ledger. He is relieved of this responsibility after handing over the ma-
terial to the storage supervisor or to the next production account in which
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Figure 5-1: Nuclear material flow chart of the NUKEM with nuclear material control points
(after Ref. /13/).
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Material accounting: The nuclear material accountancy is divided into two
parts. One part is used for the monthly reports to EURATOM and consists of a
card register in which the input and output of the plant is recorded on a
monthly time bas-is. The second is· a records-system which follows all movements
between the storage and the plant and, if necessary, within the plant on a
daily basis. For this purpose the plant is divided into several responsibili-
ty areas and for each area (Fig. 5-1) an account is kept at the central stor-
age book-keeping section. A continuous supervision of all nuclear materials
is possible here, because generally the uranium is put into the store between
two processing or control stages. In addition, the persons responsible for the
plant areas report their uranium stocks once a day to permit cross-checking.
Each batch is identified by an accompanying card, showing, inter alia, the
amount of uranium and U-235.
The accounting system has run since 1975 by means of an electronic data
banking system which makes it possible to draw at any time physical inventory
listings for all material on storage.
The inspection effort can be quantified only when, the information pro-
vided about the plant activity includes per typical input or output: the
amount of material per material balance period and per shipment, the number
of shipments, the typical item and the accuracy of the data.
The main safeguards activities of the inspectors at the NUKEM plant are
the following:
- typical HEU feed material
(1) UF 6 - check delivery notes and seals
take a sample out of each bottle (16 kg of HEU per
bottle)





check delivery notes and seals
- observe weighing
- take sample in each container
seal container.
- check delivery notes and seals




s'ample homogeneous batches at the recovery.
For material (2) and (3) in addition, immediate verifications can be
performed with the Sb-Be interrogation device and the U-235 amount determined.
On feed material statistical sampling is rarely justified and offers little
advantage.
typical product material
(1) MTR production: The number of elements of the same type produced during
one material balance period is small so that all MTR
elements are measured with the y scanner, all for con-
sistency checks, some, for which a standard is available
on an absolute basis. MTR elements for reactors in the
europeancommunity are provided with a rivet tamper re-
sistant identification seal. All element containers are
sealed for shipment.
(2) RHF cores
(3) U Metal U0
2
(4) HTR pebbles
Common standards for the cores are available. The cores
are verified with the y scanner in fixed geometry. AI-
though a large number of cores are produced the meas-
urement time is so short (10 seconds) that all cores
are measured.
Population numbers being small not statistical sampling
1s performed:
compound weight is verified
- sampIes are taken from each homogeneous batch
items are measured (100% basis) with the Sb-Be inter-
rogation device
- seals are put on all containers.
In this case statistical sampling under tamper resist-
ant conditions has been applied to the total produc-
tion.
- Items on inventory (highly enriched uranium)
In addition to the typical materials listed above the full intermediate
"good" product spectrum is at hand; typical items' are UAl billets, boxes with
cores, sandwiches, plates, cans with UAl buttons, UAl powder, UF4 powder,
K K
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containers' with kerneis, uncoated particles, coated particles, U02 powder,
U308 powder.
These materials' are mostly in such containers that their U-235 content
determination in an attribute in variable mode is possible with the Sb-Be ac-
tivitation device.
Furthermore as can be seen from the flow chart, scraps and waste are
generated in small but relevant amounts, part of it being of the directly
recyclable type. Except for a few items containing minor amounts of U-235 in
large and ill defined matrices the same measurement device (Sb-Be) is used.
At this point an important question arises about the sampling effort to
be made on such an inventory. Obviously the most reasonable way seems to di-
vide the whole set of batches to be verified into a number of subsets or
strata of like objects. This stratification is performed on the basis of the
information available under the Irheading material description" in the PIL or
in the items lists. The existing codes have proved to be satisfactory and a
better definition is certainly recommended. Since the practical application
of this concept left a large number of items uncovered or resulted in un-
wanted mixing of different items in a class, other ways have been explored.
In a nutshell, the total field is divided into number of weight classes and
a number of item type classes, the latter only for those types of materials
which are unmistakably constituting distinct classes of material. In the
case of NUKEM the latter are the fuel pebbles, the UF6 cylinders, the Ura-
nium metal and the plates for the MTR fuel elements. Weight classes are cho-
sen so that the distribution of the elements in the classes is such that to
speak of standard deviations of the elements still make some sense.
The idea underlying this subdivision is that the field is in principle
made up by measured or measurable units·. It is clear then that one of the
governing criteria is to be found in the ability a measuring device has to
confirm that a certain, defined attribute is present or not. In the ideal
situation one instrument should have this ability for aZZ the elements in
the field and they would thus' belong to a single class. In the case of NUKEM
this instrument is the Sb-Be device. The NUKEM inventory is accordingly di-
vided into ten classes of objects.
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6. Material Accountability and Data Verification
For reasons mentioned in the foregoing Chapter there does not exist a
stationary production s'tate in the NUKEM plant therefore, itis not possible
to give general representative figures for throughput and inventory. Instead,
a concrete inventory period from October 1977 to April 1978 has been selected,
which will provide the numerical data for the calculations in the third part.
In the following, only the U-235 data are considered.
The authors took the item list containing beginning physical inventory
(BI), ending physical inventory (EI) and inventory change (IC) which NUKEM
handed to EURATOM. Now we made a stratification according chemical, physical
and geometrical viewpoints and nondestructive analysis measurement methods.
In Tables 6-1, 6-2 and 6-3 the (sligthly adjusted) data for initial
physical inventory, throughput and ending physical inventory for the period
are presented. Ih Tables 6-4 and 6-5 the average relative standard deviations
of the errors of the operator's and the inspector's (destructive) measure-
ments are given, and in Table 6-6 the average relative standard deviations
of the errors of the inspector's nondestructive measurements are given. Final-
ly, in Table 6-7 the times needed for one measurement taken by the inspektor
at the plant site are presented, as they are necessary for the establishment
of sampling plans for the physical inventory.
Verification of flow data is performed either by independent measure-
ments of the inspector or simply by observation of the operator's measure-
ments.•
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Table 6-1: Physical Inventory Data from Beginning Inventory.
Class Material Total Number Average Isotopic






2 MTR, RHF Elements 28.9 53 0.55
3 HTR Elements 379.9 *)3.8*10
5
.001
4 Fuel Plates 79.5 4998 .016
5 Fuel Rods 10.3 147 .07






8 Heterogeneous Scrap, 8.2 76 .132
Liquids
Total 1334.5
*) 380 batches with 1000 items per bateh.
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Table 6-2: Inventory Changes, October 1977 to April 1978.
Material Isotopic Weight Number of Items Isotopic Weight










H Scrap 1.2 1 1.20
Total 231.2




Fuel Rods 10.3 147 .07
.jJ U0
2
Powder 13.5 15 .9::l
fr
::l
0 Pure Metals 5.0 4 1.25
Liquid Waste .2 10 .02
Total 118.2
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Table 6~3: Physieal Inventory Data from Ending Inventory.
Class Material Total Number Average Isotopie





2 MTR, RHF Elements 38.4 131 0.29
3 HTR Elements 403.5 4.04*)*10
5
.001
4 Fuel Plates 46.0 2452 .019
5 Fuel Rods - - -






9 Heterogeneous Seraps 7.2 64 .113
Liquids
Total 1447.5
*) 404 batehes with 1000 items per bateh.
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Table 6-4: Relative Standard Deviations of Errors of Operator's Destructive
Measurements.
Material Weighing U-Analysis Isotopic Analysis
syst. random syst. random syst. random
UF
6
1) 3) 2*10-3 -4 -4 1*10-3 2*10-
3- 3*10 2.5*10
MTR and RHF 3) 1*10-3
-3
2) - - - - 2*10Elements
HTR Elements
-4 5*10-4 1*10-3 2*10-3 5*10-4 1*10-
3
'5*10
Fuel Plates 3) 1*10-3
-3
(MTR) 2) - - - - 2*10






Pure Metals 5*10 1*10




Heterogeneous -2 1*10-2 1*10-2
-2
Scrap,
h10 .2 .2 1*10
Liquids




Powder - 3*10 2.5*10 1*10
Metal Alloys
3) h10-4 1*10-3 5*10-4 5*10-4
-3- 1*10
1 )
I gross-tare , weighing.
2) Measurement of characteristic radiation.
3)
As the net weight is determined by the difference of gross and tare weights,
the systematic error of the weighing cancels.
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Table 6~5: Relative Standard Deviations of Errors of Inspector's Destruc-
tive Measurements.
Material Weighing 3) U-Analysis Isotopic Analysis
syst. random syst. random syst. random
3) -3 -4 2) 5*10-4 1*10-4
2)
1*10-4UF
6 - 2*10 5*10
3) 5*10-4
2)
5*10-4MTR, RHF - - - -
HTR - 3) - - - 1*10-2 5*10-3
3) 5*10-4
2)
5*10-4Fuel Plates - - - -
3) -4
2)





Pure Metals 3*10 1*10 1*10
U0
2
Powder - 3) - 5*10-4 5*10-4 5*10-4 5*10-4
Metal Alloys - 3) - 5*10-4 5*10-4 5*10-4 5*10-4
Intermediate 3) -4 5*10-4
2)
5*10-4 5*10-4
2) -4- 5*10 5*10Products
Waste etc.
1) - 3) - - - - -
1) No independent measurement taken by the inspektor.
2) No data available, therefore the same value has been taken as for the
relative standard deviation of the random error.
3) See footnote 3) of Table 6-4.
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Table 6-6: Relative Standard Deviations of Errors of Inspector's Measure-


























y-scanning for attribute sampling.
2) Active interrogation with Cf-source.
3) Unreliable data.
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Table 6~7: Time needed for Inspector's Inventory Verification Measures





6 Seal Check 3
MTR, RHF Elements Seal Check .5
2)
HTR Elements Seal Check .5
Fuel Plates ,,-scanner 4
Fuel Rods ,,-scanner 4
Pure Metals Sb-Be 6
Intermediate Products Sb-Be 6
Waste,
Heterogeneous Scrap, Sb-Be 6
Liquids
1 )
i.e., not that time needed for destructive analyses in authorized
laboratories.




In this part we apply the theoretical results which have been laid down
in Part I to the data of a concrete plant which have been presented in Part
II. As a practical result, we get inspection sampie sizes for the various ma-
terial classes andfurthermore, the efficiency of the material accountability
and data verification procedures as weIl as that of the combined safeguards
system.
The analysis of the efficiency of safeguards measures in a concrete
plant is aprerequisite for an implementation of those measures in that plant.
Moreover, however, we believe that such a numerical exercise helps to demon-
strate the ability of statistical and game theoretical methods in evaluating
nuclear material safeguards systems.
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7. Material Accountability
According to Tables 6.1 to 6.3 the actual values of beginning and ending
inventories, receipts and shipments are
A
I
O 1334.5 [kg U-235J
A
R = 231. 2 [kg U-235J
A





therefore the actual value of MUF is with (2-2)
A
MUF = 1334. 5+231. 2~118. 2~1447.5 = 0 [kg U-235J •
Next, we determine the variance of MUF (a~UF); We calculated a~F with
average values because it was not our aim to get a
MuF
a~ precise as possible.
But at this place we have to say that there exists a computer program called
NUMSAS (see /14/) which is possible to take into account various degrees of
enrichment, content of U-235 and different standard deviations for determing
2
aMUF • In case the U-235-content of one item of one class is determined with
the help of only one measurement, the variance of the measurement error for
the whole class is given by formula (2-7). In many cases, the U-235-content
is determined by weighing, U-analysis and U-235-analysis (see also /10/). The










denotes the relative variances and X. the average true U-235-content
l-
in the i-th class, and where the single indices have the following meaning:
o operator's measurement
i number of the class





IA: Isotopic analysis •
This formula corresponds to formula (2-11") except for the facts that we
have three different measurement steps instead of only two and that sampling
errors are ignored. The variance of MUFf G~F is then given by the sum over
all class variances. With the help of the data given in Tables 6-1 to 6-4 we
get
G~UF = 8.33 [(kg U-235)2 J •
2










Stratum Inventory Inventory BI+EI -
BI[kg2 J EI[kg2 J x,l.
0.38017
-4
1 0.1839 0.19627 7.%10
-4
2 0.000885 0.0015 0.00239 7.3*10
-4
3 0.218594 0.24695 0.46554 8.7*10
-4
4 0.0064 0.00217 0.00857 7.4*10
-3
5 0.000133 0.0 0.00013 1.1*10
-4
6 0.015355 0.0187 0.03406 8.1*10
-3
7 0.814573 1. 37583 2.19040 1.%10
-1
8 2.74396 2.13538 4.87934 1.4*10
Inventory -3
Change 0.36853 1. 7*10
2 2
G~IDF = 8.33[kg J
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This leads to the standard deviation
0MUF = 2.87 [kg U-235J •
According to formula (2-23) the significance threshold s of the MUF-test
is given by
for the values 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 of the false alarm probability we therefore
get the following values of the significance threshold s:
a U s[kg U-235Jl-a
0.01 2.33 6.68
0.05 1.65 4.72
0.1 1. 28 3.68
In Figure 7-1 the dependence of the detection probability of the goal quanti-
ty M with the false alarm probability as parameter according to formula (2-24)
is represented graphically. From Figure 7-1 one can draw the conclusion that
a goal quantity of about 9[kgJ U-235 can be detected with a probability of
about 95 % if the false alarm probability is 5 % and one makes the amount of
the whole measured material is about 3 tons U-235.
8. Data Verification
In this chapter we separately haveto discuss models A and B which have
been introduced in Section 3.1.
8.1 Model- A
We assume in addition that the inspector
- does not make a seal check for the strata 2 and 3 of the beginning and end-
ing inventories as stated in Table 6-7 (instead, he checks MTR-elements with
y-scanning with an inspection effort of 4 minutes and MTR-elements with the
Sigma-machine and an inspection effort of 1 minute per item),
- only makes a seal check for the UF
6
-containers (so we get zero for the var-
iances of the random and systematic errors of the inspector which means
















Figure 7-1: Probability of detection 1-ß as a function of the goal quantity
M for the MUF-test according to formula (7-1) with aMUF=2.87[kg]
and false alarm probability a as parameter.
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- does not make independent measurements of the inventory changes, but only
supervises the operator's measurements, see chapter 6.
Starting from the data presented in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 to 7, we get for
a=ß=O.05, with the help of formulae (3-14) and (3-16) for various values of
the goal quantity Mi the inspection and falsification strategies (sample
sizes) which have been tabulated in Table 8-1.
It should be noted that in principle the total inspection effort varies
with the goal quantity Mi for fixed values of a and ß. In our example, how-
ever, we do not get numerical differences because we round the sample size
up to integer values.
With these results we are able to calculate the variance of the D-statis-





Thus, the standard deviation is
~Var(D) = 7.25[kg]
It should be noted that the falsification strategy according to Model A
seems highly artificial. On one hand, one could imagine, that a constant
falsification of all data of one class will be built in the production (or
measurement) process. On the other hand, this would represent a very inflexi-
ble strategy with all its potential hazards to the operator.
8.2 Model B
We assume in addition that the inspector
- verifies the inventory data with the methods reported in Table 6-7,
- does not make independent measurements of the inventory changes, but only
supervises the operator's measurements.
Furthermore, we assume that the operator
- falsifies those material data which he intends to falsify by the total amount
of material of the unit.
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Table 8-1: Optimal Inspection and Falsification Strategies for the Beginning
and Ending Inventory for Model A According to Formulae (3~14, 3-16
and 3-17) with a=ß=0.05.
Goal Quantity for Total Number Inspection Strat- Falsification
Total Falsifica- Stratum of Items egy Strategy
*tion N. n. *
M
1
[kg] l. l. ll. [g]l.
B,I 1)
-11 53 1 8.54*10_32 988 1 2.84*10-4
3 380000 2 6.24*10_34 4998 1 1. 53'*10_35 147 1 4.24*10_ 16 30 1 2.51*10_27 2539 1 2.25*10
1 8 76 1 1.67
EI L.)
-11 58 1 8.12*10_22 338 1 1.08* 10_4
3 404000 2 6.55*1°_3
4 2452 1 1.80*10
5 0 0 o -1
6 38 1 2.16*1°_2
7 6050 1 1.30*10
8 64 1 1.69
BI
1 53 1 1. 70 -3
2 988 1 5.67*1°_3
3 380000 2 1.25*1°_3
4 4998 1 3.05*1°_3
5 147 1 8.47*1°_1
6 30 1 5.01*1°_2
7 2539 1 4.50*10
2 8 76 1 3.34
EI
1 58 1 1.62
-22 338 1 2.16*10-3
3 404000 2 1.31*1°_3
4 2452 1 3.60*10
5 0 0 o -1
6 38 1 4.32*10_2
7 6050 1 2.60*10
8 64 1 3.38
BI
1 53 1 2.56 -3
2 988 1 8.50*10-3
3 380000 2 1.87*1°_3
3 4 4998 1 4.57*1°_2
5 147 1 1.27*1°_1
6 30 1 7.5hlO':'2
7 2539 1 6.74*10
8 76 1 5.01
(Continue +)
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Goal Quantity for Total Number Inspection Strat- Falsification
Total Falsifica- Stratum of Items egy StratE(.gy
*tion N. n. *
11
1
[kg] ~ ~ ~.[gJ~
EI
1 58 1 2.43 -2
2 338 1 3.23*10_33 404000 2 1.97*10_33 4 2452 1 5.39*10
5 0 0 o -1
6 38 1 6.47*10_
2
7 6050 1 3.90*10
8 64 1 5.07
BI
1 53 1 3.41 -2
2 988 1 1.13*10_2
3 380000 2 2.50*10_
3
4 4998 1 6.0%10-2
5 147 1 1.69*10
6 30 1 1.00 -2
7 2539 1 8.98*10
4 8 76 1 6.67
EI
1 58 1 3.24 -2
2 338 1 4.3hl0_3
3 404000 2 2.63*10_
3
4 2452 1 7.1%10
5 0 0 o -1
6 38 1 8.62*10_2
7 6050 1 5.19*10
8 64 1 6.75
BI
1 53 1 4.25 -2
2 988 1 1.4hl0_3
3 380000 2 3.13*10_3
4 4998 1 7.60*10_2
5 147 1 2.1hl0
6 30 1 1.25
7 2539 1 1.12
5 8 76 1 8.34
EI
1 58 1 4.05 -2
2 338 1 5.38*10_3
3 404000 2 3.28*10_3
4 2452 1 8.97*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 1.08 -2
7 6050 1 6.49*10
8 64 1 8.44
BI
1 53 1 5.10 -2




Goal Quantity for Total Number Inspection Strat- Falsification








34 4998 1 9.11*10_
2
5 147 1 2.53*10
6 30 1 1. 50 -1
7 2539 1 1. 35*10
6 8 76 1 10.0
EI
1 58 1 4.85 -2
2 338 1 6.44*10_
33 404000 2 3.94*10_
24 2452 1 1.08*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 1. 29 -2
7 6050 1 7.78*10
8 64 1 10.1
BI
1 53 1 8.47 -2
2 988 1 2.81*10_
33 380000 2 6.27*10_
24 4998 1 1.51*10_
2
5 147 1 4.20*10
6 30 1 2.49 -1
7 2539 1 2.24*10
10 8 76 1 16.6
EI
1 58 1 8.05 -1
2 338 1 1.07*10_3
3 404000 2 6.59*10_2
4 2452 1 1.78*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 2.14 -1
7 6050 1 1.29*10
8 64 1 16.8
BI
1 53 1 11. 8 -2
2 988 1 3.92*10_
3
3 380000 2 8.81*1°_2
4 4998 1 2.11*1°_2
5 147 1 5.85*10
6 30 1 3.46 -1
7 2539 1 3.12*10
14 8 76 1 23.2
EI
1 58 1 11. 2 -1
2 338 1 1.49*1°_3
3 404000 2 9.25*10-2
4 2452 1 2.49*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 2.98
-7
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Goal Quantity for Total Number Inspection Strat- Falsification
Total Falsifica- Stratum of Items egy Strategy







8 64 1 23.5
BI
1 53 1 15.1 -2
2 988 1 5.01*10_
23 380000 2 1.14*10_24 4998 1 2.70*10_
25 147 1 7.49*10
6 30 1 4.44 -1
7 2539 1 4.00*10
18 8 76 1 29.8
EI
1 58 1 14.3 -1
2 338 1 1.91*10_23 404000 2 1.19*10_
24 2452 1 3.18*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 3.82 -1
7 6050 1 2.32*10
8 64 1 30.2
BI
1 53 1 18.4 -2
2 988 1 6.10*10_
2
3 380000 2 1.39*10_2
4 4998 1 3.28*10_2
5 147 1 9.11*10
6 30 1 5.40 -1
7 2539 1 4.88*10
22 8 76 1 36.4
EI
1 58 1 17.5 -1
2 988 1 2.32*10_2
3 404000 2 1.46*10_2
4 2452 1 3.87*10
5 0 0 0
6 38 1 4.65 -1
7 6050 1 2.82*10
8 64 1 36.8
BI
1 53 1 20.8 -2
2 988 1 6.91*10_
2
3 380000 2 1.58*10_2
4 4998 1 3.72*10_1
5 147 1 1.03*10
6 30 1 6.11 -1
7 2539 1 5.54*10
25 8 76 1 41.3
EI
1 58 1 19.8
(Continue +)
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Goal Quantity for Total Number Inspection Strat- Falsification
Total Falsifica- Stratum of Items egy Strategy
*tion N. n. *
Mi [kg]
~ ~ \.I. [g]
~
-1
2 338 1 2.62*1°_2
3 404000 2 1.66*10_
2
4 2452 1 4.39*10
25 5 0 0 0
6 38 1 5.27 -1
7 6050 1 3.21*10






The data which are needed for the calculation of the optimal inspection
and falsification strategies according to formulae (3-28) and (3-31) are taken
from Tables 6-1, 6-3 and 6-7. If the sampie sizes of the inspector exceeded the
total number of items in the stratum, we used a two-step-procedure: The inspec-
tor was assumed to verify aZZ material data of this stratum and redistributed
his remaining effort among the other strata again according to formula (3-28).
As we did not get necessarily integers, we always rounded the figures up in
the inspector(s case, and we rounded up in the operator's case only if r~>o.05.
J.
dd ' . *'f * ( f * 'f * ,In a J.tJ.on we put r.=O J. n.=N. the act that we can get r.>O 1 n,=N. J.S aJ. J. J. J. J. J.
consequence of the drawing with replacement scheme). A consequence of this
procedure is that the diverted amount of material does not correspond exactly
to the goal quantity.
As easily can be seen, the optimal strategies depend again on the goal
quantity Mi' The results of the calculations are put together in Tables 8-2
and 8-3. Contrary to the situation in ModeZ A, where the operator had to de-
termine a-priori the optimal falsification amounts ~~, we postulated here a
J.
probability of detection of 1-ß=O.95 for each the beginning and the ending
inventory, as the operator a-priori had to decide only about the distribution
of the falsification of the total amounts for both inventories.
Contrary to the situation in case of ModeZ A the total verification ef-
fort varies for a fixed value of ß for both inventories with varying goal quan-
tity Mi' In Figures 8-1 and 8-2 the dependance between these two quantities is
represented graphically.
For the determination of the systems effectiveness, based on the MUF- and
on the D-statistics, we calculate the variance of the D-statistics according
to formula (3-44) with the help of the sampie sizes given in Tables 8-2 and
8-3. The result is given in Table 8-4. In Table 8-5 the results for C=66[min]
are given.
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Table 8-2: Optimal Inspection and Falsification strategies for the Beginning
Inventory for Model B for 6=0.05 •.
Goal Quantity
Number of




tion Strategy sion Strategy fort
M
1
[kg] * * emin]n. r.
J. J.
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 53 0
3 380*) 380 0
0.5
4 4998 479 3 15061.5
5 147 62 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 2007 2
8 76 50 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 53 0
3 380*) 380 0
1
4 4998 240 5 7807.5
5 147 31 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 1003 4
8 76 50 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 53 0
3 380*) 380 0
1.5
4 4998 160 7 5389.5
5 147 21 1
6 30 30 1
7 2539 668 6
8 76 17 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 44 0
3 380*) 380 0
2
4 4998 120 10 4179
5 147 16 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 501 7
8 76 13 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 36 0
3 380*) 380 0
2.5
4 4998 96 12 3449
5 147 13 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 401 9
8 76 10 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 30 0
3 380*) 380 0
4 4998 80 14
3 5 147 11 1 2966
6 30 30 0
7 2539 334 11









tion Strategy sion Strategy fort
M
l
[kg] * * emin]n. r,
~ ~
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 18 0
3 380*) 229 1
5
4 4998 48 23
1912.5
5 147 7 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 200 18
8 76 5 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 13 0
3 380*) 164 1
7
4 4998 35 32
1496.5
5 147 5 1
6 30 30 0
7 2539 143 25
8 76 4 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 10 1
3 380*) 128 1
9
4 4998 27 41
1216
5 147 4 2
6 30 30 0
7 2539 111 31
8 76 3 1
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 8 1
3 380*) 105 1
11
4 4998 22 50 1095.5
5 147 3 2
6 30 30 0
7 2539 91 38
8 76 3 2
1 53 53 0
2 53*) 8 1
3 380*) 92 1
12.5
4 4998 20 57 949
5 147 3 2
6 30 26 1
7 2539 80 43
8 76 2 2
*) Number of batches.
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Table 8-3: Optimal Inspection and Falsification Strategies for the Ending
Inventory for ModeZ B for 6=0.05.
Goal Quantity Optimal Inspec- Optimal Diver- Inspection Ef-
Stratum
Number of
tion Strategy sion Strategy fort
2 ItemsM
1
[kg] * * emin]n. r.
~ ~
1 58 58 0
2 131 *) 131 0
3 404*) 404 0
0.5
4 2452 280 1
17713.5
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 2610 4
8 64 44 0
1 58 58 0
2 131 *) 114 0
3 404*) 404 0
1
4 2452 140 2 9177
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 1304 8
8 64 22 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 76 0
3 404*) 404 0
1.5
4 2452 93 3 6318
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 869 11
8 64 15 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 58 0
3 404*) 404 0
2
4 2452 70 4 4891
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 652 15
8 64 11 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 46 0
3 404*) 404 0
2.5
4 2452 56 5 4031
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 521 19
8 64 9 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 39 0
3 404*) 404 0
3
4 2452 47 6 3463.5
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 434 22









tion Strategy sion Strategy fort
Mi [kg] * * emin]n. :ri~
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 23 1
3· 404*) 243 1
5
4 2452 28 10
2237
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 260 37
8 64 5 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 17 1
3 404*) 174 1
7
4 2452 20 14
1717.5
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 186 52
8 64 4 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 13 1
3 404*) 136 1
9
4 2452 16 18
1422.5
5 0 0 0
6 38 38 0
7 6050 144 66
8 64 3 1
1 58 58 0
2 131 *) 11 1
3 404*) 111 1
11
4 2452 13 22
1199
5 0 0 0
6 38 32 1
7 6050 118 81
8 64 2 1
1 58 58 0
2 131*) 10 1
3 404*) 98 1
12.5
4 2452 12 25 1086
5 0 0 0
6 38 29 1
7 6050 104 92
8 64 2 1
*) Number of batches.
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Table 8-4; Variance and Standard Deviation of the D-Statistic as Functions
of the Goal Quantity Mi for Model B with ß=0.05.
Goal Quantity var(DIHo ) ~var(DIHo) var (D IH 1) ~var (D IH1)
M
i
[kg] [kl] [kg] [kg
2] [kg]
1 39.03 6.25 39.09 6.25
2 39.14 6.26 39.45 6.28
3 39.23 6.26 39.97 6.32
4 39.33 6.27 40.66 6.38
5 39.44 6.28 41.60 6.45
6 39.50 6.28 42.62 6.53
10 39.90 6.32 48.80 6.99
14 40.16 6.34 57.70 7.60
18 40.55 6.37 69.34 8.33
22 40.90 6.40 85.89 9.27
25 41.36 6.43 101.62 10.08
It has been assumed that the inspector measures independently all items
of UF
6
, MTR and HTR.
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Table 8-5: Variance and Standard Deviation of the D-Statistic as Functions
of the Goal Quantity Mi for ModeZ Band Total Inspection Effort
C=66[min].
Goal Quanti ty var(D[Ho) ~var (D IHO) var(DIH1 ) ~var(DIH1)
M
1
[k9] [kg2 ] [kg] [kg2 ] [kg]
1 44.11 6.64 86.14 9.28
2 44.11 6.64 126.77 11.26
3 44.11 6.64 511.07 22.61
4 44.11 6.64 543.45 23.31
5 44.11 6.64 583.92 24.16
6 44.11 6.64 619.16 24.88
10 44.11 6.64 767.06 27.70
14 44.11 6.64 914.20 30.24
18 44.11 6.64 1047.56 32.37
22 44.11 6.64 1193.25 34.54
25 44.11 6.64 1298.78 36.04
It has been assumed that the inspector measures independently all items
of UF
6
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Figure 8-1: Inspection effort C as a function of goal quantity M~ for
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Figure 8-2: Inspection effort C as a function of goal quantity M~ for
ending inventory in model B with ß=O.05.
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9. Detectiön pröbability of the Combined System
In this chapter we determine the efficiency, i.e., the overall proba-
bility of detection for the combined safeguards system based on the MUF and
on the D-statistics. Again we have to discuss models A and B separately.
We proceed as follows: We start with a fixed value of the verification
effort C which has been determined in such a way that the probability for de-
tecting a data falsification is presumed equal to 1-ß=0.95 (which in case of
Model A is numerically independent of the value of the goal quantity Mi) for
a given value of a=0.05. It is clear that in the course of the optimation
procedure the probability of detecting a data falsification alone may shift
to a value different from 0.95.
The total probability of detection for the MUF-D-test is according to
formula (3-12) given by
1-ß (9-1 )
whereas the total probability of detection for the (D,MUF)-test is according














optimization procedure (4-9), and where in both cases the variances
and a~IHl depend on the specific model under consideration.
9.1 Model A
From section 4.2 we know that the (MUF-D)-test is a best test if the
operator diverts all material via the data falsification strategy. In Fig-
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Figure 9-1: Probability of detection of the (MUF-D)-, Neymann-Pearson- and
(D,MUF)-test for different diversion strategies in ModeZ A;
goal quantity M=M1+M2
=5kg, a=O.05.
The figure shows for each M
1
the detection probability for
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Figure 9-2: Probability of detection of the (MUF-D)- and the (D,MUF)-test






The figure shows for each Mi the detection probability for






tection for the MUF-D-test as a function of the total data falsification
(Mi) for fixed values of the goal quantity M according to formula
resp. (9-1) which is independent of Mi because in the variances
N~
~ 2 2









according to the procedure outlined above.
It should be noted here that the operator has to falsify data con-
sistently: If he reports, e.g., less material as initial inventory
than really in the plant, then he also has to report less material
I
as ending inventory than really in the plant (or less inputs, or
more outputs). This means that, if he falsifies all data by an a-




In Figures 9-1 and 9-2, also the probability of detection for the bi-
variate (D,MUF)-test is represented graphically as a function of the total da-
ta falsification (Mi) for fixed values of the goal quantity M according to





that in a range of small values of Mi the bivariate (D,MUF)-test leads to a
higher probability of detection, however, in the larger range the MUF-D-test
is better.
9.2 Model B
Contrary to the case of modeZ A, section 4.2 does not tell us anything











=M-M' for model B. In Figures 9-3 and 9-4 we have represented
graphically the probability of detection for the MUF-D-test as a function of
the total data falsification (Mi) for fixed values of the goal quantity M ac-
cording to the (here only approximatively valid) formula (3-43) resp. (9-1),
where in the variances
2
N. 2 2L..2:.: (cr . +n .• cr .)























Figure 9-3: Probability of detection of the (MUF-D)- and the bivariate
(D,MUF)-test for different diversion and inspection strategies




=5kg, variances as in Table
8-4, a=O.05.
The figure shows for each M
1
the detection probability for
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Figure 9-4: Probability of detection of the (MUF-D)- and the (D,MUF)-test





=25kg, variances as in Table 8-4, a=O.05.
The figure shows for each Mi the detection probability for





the sample sizes n, are determined with the help of formula (3-27) for one
1
fixed value of Mi according to the procedure outlined in the introduction of
this chapter.
In Figures 9-3 and 9-4, also the probability of detection for the bi-
variate (D,MUF)-test is represented graphically as a function of the total
data falsification (Mi) for fixed values of the goal quantity M according to
* *(4-7) resp. (9-2), with optimized false alarm probabilities a 1 and a 2 • Again,
we see that in a range of small values of Mi' the bivariate (D,MUF)-test
leads to a higher probability of detection, however, in the larger range the
MUF-D-test is better.
In Figure 9-5, the probability of detection both for the MUF-D and the
(D,MUF)-test is represented graphically as a function of the total data falsi-
fication (Mi) for fixed values of the goal quantity M with variances cr~IHo and
cr21 taken from table 8-5, i.e. for a fixed verification effort C. If we com-
D Hl
pare the data in Figure 9-5 with the corresponding data in Figure 9-3, we
notice that a smaller verification effort leads to a higher probability of
detection! This contradiction can be explained as follows: Formula (3-16) for
the optimal sample sizes of the inspector can in certain limiting cases also
be obtained by an optimization procedure where the variance cr~IHl is minimized.
The probability of detection (9-1), however, is maximized for minimized vari-
-2
ance crDIHl only if
M-Ul_a·~cr~IH -cr~F' > 0 ,
o
otherwise the probability of detection is minimized. In case of the probabil-
ity of detection (9-2) we observe a similar phenomenon. The conclusion to be
drawn is that our procedure - determination of the sample sizes with the help
of formula (3-27) and performance of the D-test leads only to reasonable re-
sults with respect to the (approximated) probabilities of detection (9-1) and
(9-2), if the goal quantity M is not too small compared to the standard de-
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Figure 9-5: Probability of detection of the (MUF-D)- and the (D,MUF)-test
for different diversion strategies in Model. B; goal quantity
M=Mi +M2=5kg, variances as in Table 8-7, a=O.05.
The figure shows for each Mi the detection probability for







In this paper the detection probability of alternative statistical eval-
uation schemes for the nuclear material safeguards measures have been analyzed
at the hand of concrete fabrication plant data. It has been shown that it is a
prerequisite for such an analysis to take into account all possible diversion
and control strategies which in turn depend on the evaluation schemes.
Because of the complexity of the system apriori it was clear that an
evaluation scheme could not be found which was superior to all other schemes.
This is true also for the Neyman-Pearson-test, which by definition is the
best test if the diversion strategy is completely specified, because the in-
spector cannot know this strategy and therefore has to make assumptions on
global strategies. The minimax-procedure which is a consequence of this lack
of one of the analyzed procedures (MUF-D, or (D,MUF), or others). It was the
intent of the anaZyticaZ investigations to clarify this situation as far as
possible, and it was the intent of the numerical calculations to show the
numerical differences of the detection probabilities of the different proce-
edures. It has also been mentioned that in view of these results, practicaZ
arguments will have to determine the final decisions.
There are many aspects of nuclear material safeguards based on the mate-
rial balance principle which have not been tackled in this paper. We only
mention the question of the subdivision of plants into several material bal-
ance areas, or the question of the number of inventory periods during a ref-
erence time which has to da with the question of the appropriate detection
time. There are studies on all of these questions however, it would be tao
early at this step of development to try to put tagether all these ideas:
the present paper might give an idea how many 'models', 'alternatives' and
'schemes' would have to be taken into account. Instead, on first has to try
to rule out same of these by common sense arguments; thereafter only one can
proceed with theoretical investigations.
One major aspect of this study was to find out, under which assumptions
simplified formulae or procedures can be justified, infact, inspectors at
the plant site or in the headquarters cannot be expected to handle tao com-
plicated a formalism. For this reason the data verification problems we con-
sidered in greater detail, and it was shown, e.g., under which conditions
presently used formulae for the determination of inspection sampIe sizes are
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approximately valid. Concrete proposals, however, were not made in this
study because this should be left to the practitioners, as already stated.
This is true even more for the question whether or not the safeguards
system in its present form is considered to fulfill the requirements of the
Non-Proliferation-Treaty, at least in the case of the plant considered here.
The effifiency, i.e. the relation between probability of detection, goal
quantity, false alarm probability, and inspection effort has been calculated
numerically for an inventory period of 6 months: It remains to be decided by
the safeguards authorities whether one can live with these results or not
and then, consequently, has to search for further means.
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